However, the study of spacepower -the use of outer space's military and economic advantages for strategic ends -remains a small subfield within strategic studies (Gray 1996; Dolman 2002; Klein 2006; Sheehan 2007; Lutes et al 2011 , Harding 2013 . Rarer still is that of the strategic aspects of British space activities (Sheldon 2010; Hill 2011; Quintana 2017) . This article begins to address this gap by arguing that the discussion and study of British security strategy is missing the enabling link of spacepower. British freedom of action on Earth, and its critical infrastructure, is influenced by its dependencies on others in space. This article also presents a brief contextual analysis of the major space powers as assessing British spacepower is a relative and contextual task. Spacepower is one of the essential 'elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the This article proceeds by first categorising Britain as a secondary space power in the international context and identifying strengths and dependencies in British space capabilities. A 'space power' is an entity that uses outer space for its political objectives; whilst 'spacepower' is 'the ability in peace, crisis, and war to exert prompt and sustained influence in or from space' (Sheldon 2010: 28). Spacepower is more than missile defence systems or the exploitation of the informationbased 'Revolution in Military Affairs ' (Gray and Sheldon 1999: 24). Spacepower also assists in the development of a state's security, economy, and infrastructure in a subtler yet more pervasive grand strategic sense. Space technology is used for precision agriculture as well as precision bombing.
However, the study of spacepower -the use of outer space's military and economic advantages for strategic ends -remains a small subfield within strategic studies (Gray 1996; Dolman 2002; Klein 2006; Sheehan 2007; Lutes et al 2011 , Harding 2013 . Rarer still is that of the strategic aspects of British space activities (Sheldon 2010; Hill 2011; Quintana 2017) . This article begins to address this gap by arguing that the discussion and study of British security strategy is missing the enabling link of spacepower. British freedom of action on Earth, and its critical infrastructure, is influenced by its dependencies on others in space. This article also presents a brief contextual analysis of the major space powers as assessing British spacepower is a relative and contextual task. Spacepower is one of the essential 'elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's (wartime and peacetime long term) interests,' (Kennedy 1991: 5) regardless of the size of the state in question. Space technology and services, which are integral parts of modern defence industries and critical infrastructures, enable the full spectrum of British military capabilities and its high-technology economy.
This article proceeds by first categorising Britain as a secondary space power in the international context and identifying strengths and dependencies in British space capabilities. A 'space power' is an entity that uses outer space for its political objectives; whilst 'spacepower' is 'the ability in peace, crisis, and war to exert prompt and sustained influence in or from space' (Sheldon 2010: 28) . Spacepower is more than missile defence systems or the exploitation of the informationbased 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (Gray and Sheldon 1999: 24) . Spacepower also assists in the development of a state's security, economy, and infrastructure in a subtler yet more pervasive grand strategic sense. Space technology is used for precision agriculture as well as precision bombing.
Satellites in orbit ensure a web of connectivity around the Earth and gather all manner of information about human and natural behaviour and systems on Earth. Second, it examines the increasing institutional recognition of space in Whitehall set against the context of austerity-led strategy-making 
Britain as a secondary space power
Space is not tainted by a past of British dominance and decline; yet its secondary status in space has not informed the independent or autonomous roles scholars have ascribed to the UK on Earth since space technology became essential to the battlefield in the 1990s. Gaskarth (2014: 566) outlined six possible roles for the UK: isolate, regional partner, influential rule of law state, thought leader, opportunist-interventionist, and great power. A missing link in discussions of Britain's role is that the capability to fulfil any role will depend upon British spacepower and its degree of integration into the binary context of American and collective European spacepower. This omission of outer space is not surprising given how such thinking of roles relies upon identity and capabilities, and not so much on geographic realities (Gaskarth 2014: 561) . Focusing on geography in strategy today highlights space as a common that must be commanded by the United States and its allies (Posen 2003: 7) .
Britain's current and potential spacepower supports conceptions of Britain's role as a regional power and a contributor for rules and norm-building in the international system. However, it contrasts with other conceptions of Britain's role as an independent great power (Morris 2011: 331-336; McCourt 2014: 160-168) . As seen in Table 1 , Britain lacks in military space capabilities when compared with the United States, Russia, China, and India yet it does produce significant commercial outputs relative to its European peers. Whilst Britain has returned to its maritime roots following the 2015 defence review (Childs 2016: 141) , without a greater number and spread of sovereign space assets -particularly surveillance or Earth observation (EO) satellites -British air and naval power projection will increase its traditional reliance on a 'principal ally' (Freedman 1999: 29) . The headline combat capabilities that the UK has invested in reaffirm a desire by London to project maritime and air combat capabilities through two new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, the F-35B Lightning II, the creation of two extra Typhoon squadrons (HMG 2015c) . Future developments in unmanned aircraft and expeditionary warfare increase dependencies on space communications, and also the 'first look' capability that space-based reconnaissance and EO satellites allow. Without spacepower, deployed 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 2013: 78-79) . It is a useful contextual starting point because it distinguishes a distribution of capabilities. Primary -Tier 1 -space powers have independent and comprehensive launch, manufacturing, design, development, and operations. They also possess sovereign space technology production capability, extant or almost operational launch capability for both low-Earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) launches, whose space programmes have evolved from ballistic missile and nuclear programmes, and have breadth and depth in deployed satellites. In addition, primary space powers must be able to command space to varying degrees through controlling the environment and denying it to adversaries with destructive weapons (Bowen 2017: 9-13) . The United States, Russia, and China easily fit this description and form the primary or Tier 1 space powers (Weeden 2014; Pollpeter 2016 indicators of an actor's power -even when limited to a particular geostrategic environment -as material realities do not reflect unquantifiable aspects of power such as trust between allies, the quality of decision-making and strategies, political stability, credibility, prestige, and soft power (Vital 1971: 16) . It is not the aim here to generalise about the behaviour of secondary space powers or provide a universal model, as each actor will appear unique under more detailed idiographic -as opposed to nomothetic -study. Yet, a broad context-setting exercise and in-depth examination of one space power requires a working image of the general international material distribution of spacepower as a point of departure for more detailed analysis.
Britain is a secondary space power that outsources much of its top-end military and intelligence capabilities that its diplomatic and power projection efforts rely upon. But it retains niche commercial and industrial space capabilities that keeps it above the tertiary class of spacepower and firmly within the secondary tier. The UK's only indigenous and sovereign space-based capability -
the Skynet communications satellites -were launched aboard American rockets. These seven satellites provide dedicated communications for UK military and allied users. This enables the UK to provide extra capacity for allied communications, and purchases some influence in multilateral operations which quickly consume readily available bandwidth. Britain also operates two terrestrial stations that augments its military space capacities -Royal Air Force (RAF) Fylingdales and RAF High Wycombe. Although RAF Fylingdales is ostensibly a missile detection radar, it is also used to detect, track, and identify objects in Earth orbit. This radar can track satellites as well as debris, which is an increasing security concern (Bowen 2014: 58-65 The United States leads in the total number of deployed satellites, in particular commercial communications and EO. China and Russia are 'runners up' in the Tier 1 category, thanks to their spread of launch and satellite deployment capacities. India and Japan, whilst capable of varied launch options, remain Tier 2 space powers due to their relative lack of depth and mass in deployed assets compared to Tier 1 space powers. The EU and ESA (European Space Agency) are difficult actors to categorise, as they are not states, but through integration they represent a potential European Tier 1 It is in the commerce and industry of space that Britain appears as a more significant actor, rather than as a military space power. Economic space power could provide more opportunities for Britain's views to be considered in global governance and industry regulation activities. Since 1999, the UK space industry's income has trebled, growing at an average rate of 8.1 per cent per annum, whilst employment in the space industry has grown annually at 6.7 per cent. The UK Space Agency (UKSA) estimates that wider UK industrial activities worth £250bn, or 13.8 per cent of gross domestic product in the non-financial business economy, is supported by satellite services. Currently, British space exports are evenly split between the European market and the global market (UKSA 2016: 1, 10, 12) . The UK's success with the commercial Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) programme demonstrates a demand at home and outside Europe for small satellite-based imaging and observation data and services (Sheldon 2010: 33) . SSTL has successfully exported DMC satellites to Nigeria, China, and India, and is a potential model for export for a multitude of other states and customers. Furthermore, if the British government's optimism on the economics of small air-launched 
Leviathan wakes? Whitehall in space
The absence of a discussion of spacepower is notable even within the general vacuum of political thought regarding British 'grand' strategy and national security (Porter 2010: 6) . The British state has published a series of documents which recognises spacepower as a source of national power and international influence. This official recognition is welcome, as space must be taken seriously as a strategic environment and not treated merely as a flight of fancy or an opportunity for questionable puns and science fiction references (Kelso 2016: 44) (HMG 2015a: 19, 29-30, 46 ).
The NSP states that 'Government will treat space threats in the same way as we would approach any other threat to our strategic national interests' (HMG 2015a: 11) . This attitude is prudent as it challenges prevailing notions in the field of space security that 'space deterrence' can be considered as a matter separate from and different to deterring war in general. Rather, conventional and nuclear deterrence already subsume satellites as stabilising assets (Sheldon 2009: 35) . The recognition of Britain's reliance on international partners and allies is distributed throughout the NSP and NSSP; yet it is scarcely recognised that Britain as a secondary spacepower like smaller naval powers, is 'likely to have only limited independence of strategic decision when up against' much larger powers with incongruent national interests (Till 2014: 23) . The 2015 NSS declares that Britain should be able to The NSSP declares that the UK will meet its space requirements by its own means 'when a purely domestic responsibility or specific sovereign interest makes this necessary' (HMG 2014a: 5) . This is wishful thinking without a clear statement of intent about which space capabilities to develop and the appropriation of funds to do it, and beckons a more deliberate strategic approach such as 'smart muddling through' in order to secure the most potent force achievable with restrictive resources (Cornish and Dorman 2012: 222) . This is explored further below according to the principles of Open Procurement and Technology Advantage. Whilst the NSSP is right to highlight Britain's integration and track record in relying on the United States and cooperating with the EU and the European Space Agency (ESA) to 'augment' its spacepower, the illusion of a sovereign military space capability remains. This mismatch between resources, commitment, and ambitions may be typical of an intellectual vacuum in British strategy-making (Porter 2010: 6) , and creates a problematic missing link between British strategy on Earth and the support from space services it needs to carry out its roles.
Increasing UK commercial space activities could raise the profile of spacepower in the eyes of policymakers (Sheldon 2010: 28) , and that may be borne out given institutional publications since 2010. The NSP declares that strong leadership is required in commercial space from HMG (2015b: 4).
Unfortunately, the May government's Industrial Strategy makes only scant and vague reference to the commercial space sector despite the ambitious plans laid out in space policy and space industrial documents and the UK Space Bill (HMG 2017: 15, 31) . Moreover, the NSP does not go far enough in detailing how the benefits of a larger space economy can contribute towards increased unilateral strategic capabilities for decision-makers -particularly in the fields of EO and surveillance satellites. (Sheldon 2010: 29-32 ). This could be particularly true of redirected American space intelligence assets that Britain relies upon. As expansive as the US intelligence and military machine is, it is not without its gaps that Britain could seek to fill. Most states that possess nuclear weapons have also developed an independent ability to launch spy or EO satellites -but not Britain, which has 'outsourced' it to the United States within the highly institutionalised intelligence and nuclear special relationship (Xu 2016 (Xu : 1212 (Xu -1222 . The UK's operationally independent nuclear deterrent relies upon American satellites to provide targeting data (Norris 2008: 158) . The UK, like all NATO forces, has also become dependent upon and fully integrated with GPS for precision strike and navigation capabilities.
The British state, as it attempts to depart the EU, risks becoming ever-more a satellite of the United States. It is not certain that British scientific, economic, military, and diplomatic interests will be best served by integrating further, particularly as Congress can upend long term space exploration and science programmes unilaterally. 'Muddling through,' rather than making hard strategic choices (Rathmel 2011: 31-32) , risks diminishing British spacepower, with direct strategic consequences for Britain's relative autonomy on Earth. Spacepower is essential for a 'smart muddling through' approach for British grand strategy and a role in the world that relies on rules, norms, information, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Oliver and Williams 2016: 554) . A looser relationship with the EU will signal a weaker claim to stand apart from the United States and continue to be a 'great power', as exemplified through Britain's 'special relationship' with US military spacepower. British thinking should take a practical view of the changing global power distribution and the place of the special relationship within it (Zala 2015:13-14) . Britain must account for not only the rise of Asian spacepowers (Harvey, Henk and Pirard 2008: 1-253, 439-541) , but also the fact that it cannot avoid the competitive aspects of transatlantic astropolitics. On the one hand, the special relationship has integrated Britain into American spacepower. On the other hand, space is one area where the EU has been very active and has drawn in Britain, and not solely relied on its 'magnetism' or attraction by 'being' (Clarke 2011: 11) . A utilitarian British approach to outer space (Sheldon 2010: 33) has resulted in its integration into European and EU space policy, particularly in the development of navigation systems, EO, and weather satellites. Europe can provide an alternative source of space infrastructure than can make up France enjoys a close relationship with Italy and Germany in space surveillance and EO data sharing, where Paris provides the latter with imagery intelligence, whilst it in turn receives synthetic aperture radar services from Berlin and Rome (Norris 2008: 162) . This is also the basis of the EU's MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Observation) programme which would combine the complementary distribution of European satellite 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Table 1 . A further risk for Britain will be that the EU could be strengthened in space at the expense of NATO. Formal EU-NATO relationship structures would enable NATO to tap into the considerable and growing EU space infrastructure. Britain's exit from the EU will ensure that its spacepower has been denied an institutional foothold in one half of that relationship (Dunn and Webber 2016: 474-475) , whilst the other space powers of Europe will have a presence in both institutions to further their space policies.
Page 14 of 29 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

Page 16 of 29 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
The spacepower element of grand strategy illustrates Britain's difficult position in attempting to bridge the gap between American and 'European' strategic interests. Brexit in space, as well as defence more generally, means the British may be warier of the Europeanization of its defence capabilities, whilst the French will seek to check any atlanticization of its own defence dependencies (Durand 2011: 110) . With British access to allied spacepower perhaps resting upon what Britain can offer in space on a quid-pro-quo basis, rather than offering alternative intelligence or special forces capabilities on the ground (Sheldon 2010: 29) , Brexit raises the pressure for Britain to become more unilaterally useful for the United States and NATO in space if it is to make up for Brexit's impact on British spacepower. British grand strategy must consider what exactly it must be able to do in space by itself, as American resources and commitments may not enable Washington to provide London with timely access to all the space support it requires or requests (Sheldon 2010: 32) . As Brexit unfolds, it may be that London will no longer be able to ensure its interests are taken into account in Brussels either. However, this approach is tempered by the principle of Technology Advantage which seeks to ensure that London has a secure supply base and assured capability in the most critical areas within 'value for money', such as nuclear warheads, cryptography, and electronic warfare (MoD 2012: 19, 25, 27) . Sovereignty, as opposed to dependency, means an ability to ensure an operational advantage (i.e.
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If Britain is to purchase new space capabilities and go beyond staffing more space imagery analysts, there are three general considerations in terms of procurement policy. The first is that 'buying British' could support small and medium space enterprise within the UK, as procurement 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Sadeh and Vallance 2009: 140-141; De Selding 2011; 2017b) . A third option is to purchase and integrate with European allies in space, and buy into the MUSIS programme. However, Brexit produces a great deal of uncertainty as to Britain's position in European space programmes that are increasingly influenced by the European Union, and its commerce and autonomy-driven space strategy (European Commission 2016: 8) . These last two options, however, would make it harder for the UK to reach its space industrial objectives and of supporting small to medium sized enterprises in contributing to defence capabilities.
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Both 'soft' and 'hard' Brexits risk Britain's ability to influence the direction of EU spacepower. Despite the immediate politics of Brexit, Britain's position between America and Europe will not change overnight (Cornish and Dorman 2015: 369-370) . If Britain decides that it will not secure the interests of its space economy, and will not invest in sovereign space systems for the most (Rathmel 2011: 22; Oliver and Williams 2016: 555) . The other four permanent members of the UN Security Council possess either comprehensive spacepower capabilities or the strategic essentials that guarantee an independent ability to launch and target nuclear weapons, and integrate spacepower into their conventional military forces.
A crucial piece of the future of British spacepower now rests in the future independence of ESA from the EU. In recent decades the independence of the inter-governmental ESA from the EU, and the militarisation of European space institutions have become the subject of considerable debate (Hoerber 2009: 206-208; Oikonomou 2012: 105) . Furthermore, 86 per cent of ESA's revene, €1.7bn, derives from the EU, on top of direct contributions from member states which total €3.7bn in 2017.
Britain remains the fourth largest direct contributor to ESA at €300m in 2017, after Germany where the UK maintains full 'access' to the SEM, its political voice in the strategic direction of Europe, and consequently European spacepower, will be diminished as a price of leaving the EU (Uttley and Wilkinson 2016b: 496-497) . As Britain is leaving the EU, the EU's space industrial policy may become a direct challenge rather than an asset for British spacepower.
The EU has traditionally suffered blocking actions in military integration by Britain, yet it also cannot do without Britain as a significant terrestrial military power in Europe (Biscop 2012 (Biscop : 1297 (Biscop -1298 . There may be greater potential to dovetail EU space integration in support of CSDP objectives now that Britain may not be able to block further integration from within the EU. The EU's 2016 space strategy has cited its space programme's applications in security and defence as a priority area, and the strategy is clear that space is a key enabler for the EU's defence and security policy objectives on Earth (European Commission 2016: 2, 5, 8, 10). Indeed, as the EU and its members are on the cusp of reducing their strategic dependence on American GPS through Galileo, Britain is heading for the door. Britain, then, is caught between Europe and America, and its particular relationships in space with them will influence the degree of freedom of action Britain has. America and France (via the EU) are militarily significant powers with their own spectra of space services to support whatever roles they choose for themselves. Britain is still a terrestrially significant power in a coalition that adds significant military capability, but is a potentially client military space power with a commercial space sector now competing against the EU's space industrial policy.
Conclusion
Britain has developed niche capabilities in secure military communications, commercial communications, and the small satellite industry, and the greater institutional recognition it has been awarded is to be welcomed. British spacepower benefits from military and intelligence cooperation with the United States and France, yet this strains British principles of freedom of action and technology advantage whilst Brexit could make the EU's space industrial policy a threat to the British space sector. As Britain continues to invest in its significant ability to project power overseas, Britain should consider whether it needs a more sovereign EO capability and a greater depth in communications satellites to support its expeditionary warfare capabilities and its booming domestic in terrestrial power projection, it must question whether it is comfortable with the fundamental pillars of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities needed to support such precisionwarfare and networked forces remaining outside of sovereign British space infrastructure.
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